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MISSING TRADER INTRA-COMMUNITY AND 
CAROUSEL VAT FRAUDS - ECJ AND ECtHR CASE LAW 
Jernej Podlipnik*
Summary: This paper explains what missing trader intra-Community 
and carousel frauds are and how they are performed. A fault in taxing 
intra-Community supplies with value added tax (VAT) enables these 
frauds to take place. Member States and the European Commission 
are aware of the fault but are unable to agree on how to change the 
taxation of the mentioned supplies. Therefore, the fi ght against these 
frauds is conducted by improving tax inspection, tax cooperation be-
tween Member States, imposing liability on persons participating in 
the transactions in which these frauds occur, and disallowing the de-
duction of input VAT. The European Court of Justice and the European 
Court of Human Rights have dealt with liability and deduction cases. 
They have decided that closing the tax gap by recovering VAT from 
persons participating in the transactions is legal if it is done in accor-
dance with the so-called knowledge test.
1. Introduction
Missing trader intra community (hereinafter: MTIC) Value Added 
Tax (hereinafter: VAT) frauds, also called carousel VAT frauds, are the 
largest1 form of the most serious EU VAT frauds.2 It is estimated that EU 
Member States lose EUR 100 billion per annum through this systematic 
tax fraud.3 Originally,4 MTIC VAT frauds were committed in specifi c in-
*  Tax advisor and research assistant at the Graduate School of Government and European 
Studies (Fakulteta za državne in evropske študije), Kranj, Slovenia.
1  Daniel Kroesen and Walter de Wit, ‘VAT Fraud in the Emissions and Energy Sector’ 
(2011) Indirect Tax Briefi ng Issue 2, <http://www.ey.com/Publication/vwLUAssets/Indi-
rect_Tax_in_2011/$FILE/Indirect_Tax_2011.pdf> accessed 4 April 2012, 7.  
2  Other forms of serious EU VAT frauds, which will not be discussed here, are: missing trad-
er extra-community fraud in tradable services (MTEC); non-compliance by registered fi rms 
or sales suppression (a fraud of manipulating cash register records); and non-registration. 
For a detailed analysis of the fi rst two, see Richard T Ainsworth, ‘Zappers & Phantom-Ware: 
A Global Demand for Tax Fraud Technology’ (2008) Boston University School of Law Work-
ing Paper No 08-20 <http://www.bu.edu/law/faculty/scholarship/workingpapers/docu-
ments/AinsworthR060208.pdf> accessed 2 April 2012; Richard T Ainsworth, ‘VAT Fraud: 
MTIC & MTEC - The Tradable Services Problem’ (2010) Boston University School of Law 
Working paper No 10-39 <http://www.bu.edu/law/faculty/scholarship/workingpapers/
documents/AinsworthR111210.pdf> accessed 31 March 2012.
3  Kroesen and de Wit (n 1) 7.  
4  Supposedly the fi rst version of MTIC fraud in the EU involved smuggling gold across the 
Luxembourg border, where the tax rate for gold was 0%, selling this gold with VAT in an-
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dustries by transactions with high value / low weight goods such as mo-
bile phones and computer microchips (mostly central processing units 
or CPUs) because they were easy and inexpensive to transport. Since 
then, frauds have shifted to the sales of other goods (new and used motor 
vehicles, wood, alcohol and tobacco products, oil and oil derivatives, gas 
and electricity, etc.) and even to the tradable services5 sector (software, 
licensing, data provision, emissions trading, etc)6 which, unlike goods, 
do not need to be moved, because they are immaterial. 
MTIC occurs because of a fundamental fl aw in the design of the EU 
VAT system. This type of fraud is not known in other (non-EU) tax sys-
tems which tax consumption.7 Businesses participating in such frauds 
abuse a fundamental fl ow in the design of the EU VAT system8 that has 
existed since 1 January 1993, when the internal market was established9 
and when barriers to internal (intra-Community) trade were therefore 
abolished. Member States adopted a transitional system under which 
intra-Community business-to-business transactions are taxed in the 
Member State of destination, at the rate and under the conditions of that 
Member State. These transactions are basically taxed as if they were ex-
ports from one Member State and imports to another Member State. This 
means that sales are zero-rated and therefore no VAT is charged on pur-
chases. This allows taxable persons to collect VAT from the purchasers 
on onward sales and then to disappear without remitting the collected 
tax.10 In comparison with real exports and imports, in intra-Commu-
other Member State, and then disappearing. At least for investment gold, a special scheme 
was adopted in the EU VAT system in 1993 to combat fraud in that market. Ainsworth, ‘VAT 
Fraud: MTIC & MTEC’ (n 2) 29. 
5  Most services are so-called consumed services, which are consumed on purchase. Auto 
repairs, construction, restaurant services are a few examples of these services. Because 
of their nature, they are consumed by the person these services are supplied to. Other 
kinds of services are so-called tradable services. They are designed from the beginning for 
re-sale. They are hybrid supplies that behave commercially like goods but have functional 
attributes that make them hard to distinguish from services generally. Ainsworth, ‘VAT 
Fraud: MTIC & MTEC (n 2) 1. 
6  Kroesen and de Wit (n 1) 7.
7  But it should be noted that, in general, every VAT regime is susceptible to missing trader 
fraud, because in every VAT regime circumstances exist where business-to-business transac-
tions are made without VAT being charged. This rule allows missing trader VAT fraud to take 
place. Richard T Ainsworth, ‘VAT Fraud and Technological Solutions’ (2011) The VAT Reader 
- What a Federal Consumption Tax Would Mean for America <http://www.taxanalysts.com/
www/freefi les.nsf/Files/VATReader.pdf/$fi le/VATReader.pdf> accessed 22 April 2012, 204.
8  European Union Committee, Stopping the Carousel: Missing Trader Fraud in the EU (HL 
2006-07, 101) para 2. 
9  Peter Grilc and Tomaž IlešiË, Pravo Evropske unije, vol 1 (Cankarjeva založba 2001) 38-39.
10  Commission Staff Working Paper, ‘On Measures to Change the VAT System to Fight 
Fraud’ COM(2008)109 <http://ec.europa.eu/transparency/regdoc/rep/2/2008/EN/2-
2008-249-EN-1-0.Pdf> accessed 3 May 2012, 8.
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nity transactions goods are not controlled physically at borders, but only 
through document control (VAT returns and recapitulative statements). 
The second section of this article explains how MTIC and carousel 
VAT frauds are carried out. In order to understand the discussion that 
follows, we will begin with a simple explanation of the current VAT sys-
tem, focusing on intra-Community trade and will continue by defi ning 
MTIC and carousel VAT frauds and measures to prevent them. In the 
third section, milestone cases in which the ECJ has dealt with MTIC or 
carousel VAT frauds are described. These decisions are frequently used, 
at least in Slovenia, in tax inspectors’ decisions and in court judgements 
to elaborate reasons for them. As Croatia is to become the 28th Member 
State on 1 July 2013 it will soon have to deal with the VAT fraud that is 
discussed in this article. Section four deals mostly with the leading VAT 
case where the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) decided that 
Article 1 of Protocol 1 to the European Convention on Human Rights 
(ECHR) had been violated. Section fi ve analyses the ECJ and ECtHR 
case law and section six concludes the article.
2. What are MTIC VAT frauds and carousel VAT frauds?
In this section we will fi rst explain the basics of the EU VAT regime. 
This will help us understand how MTIC and carousel frauds are per-
formed. The last subsection deals with possible measures to fi ght MTIC 
and carousel VAT frauds. 
2.1. The transitional VAT regime for intra-Community supplies of 
goods
VAT in EU is a general turnover tax, or, in other words, a general 
indirect tax on consumption of goods and services. It is an all-stage tax, 
which means that all stages of distribution and production are covered. 
The tax credit (invoice) method allows taxable persons to deduct VAT 
paid on purchases (input) from the tax due on sales (output).11 
To put it simply,12 according to Article 2 RVD, four transactions are 
subject to VAT: 
11  Article 1 of the Recast VAT Directive (hereinafter: RVD), Council Directive 2006/112/EC 
of 28 November 1996 on the Common System of Value Added Tax [2006] OJ L 347 1. 
For a detailed theoretical explanation of different sorts of VAT, see Ben Terra and Julie Ka-
jus, A Guide to the European VAT Directives, vol 1 (IBFD 2011) 271-314.
12  In should be noted that the listed transactions are only subject to VAT if other criteria 
are met. All, except importation, are only subject to VAT if they are made for consideration 
and by a taxable person acting as such (in general, a person who has a VAT identifi cation 
number). 
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- supplies of goods within the territory of a Member State; 
- intra-Community acquisition of goods within the territory of a 
Member State in (simplifi ed) business-to-business transactions;13
- supplies of services within a territory of a Member State; and 
- importation of goods. 
As mentioned above, a transitional14 VAT system for intra-Commu-
nity transactions is currently in use. The transitional arrangement be-
tween Member States was supposed to be replaced by a defi nitive system 
for the taxation of trade between Member States based in principle on 
the taxation in the Member State of origin of the goods or services sup-
plied. The date for replacement was set for 31 December 1996, but it was 
already arranged that the period of application of the transitional ar-
rangements would be extended automatically until the date of entry into 
force of the defi nitive system and in any event until the Council decided 
on the defi nitive system.15 This transitional system is still valid today,16 
which makes MTIC frauds possible.
Since business-to-business intra-Community acquisitions are con-
sidered as taxable transactions, such intra-Community supplies are VAT 
free. Actually, they are zero-rated, which means that the supplier is enti-
tled to a VAT deduction or a refund of input VAT in the ‘exporting’ Member 
State. The intention of zero rates is to safeguard the principle of taxation in 
the country of destination.17 The intra-Community supplier can therefore 
deduct or claim a refund of the amount of his input VAT regarding the sup-
plied goods in the country of origin. In the country of destination, the ac-
quirer is obliged to self-account18 the amount of VAT on this transaction19 
13  Exceptions for sales made by small entrepreneurs, distance selling, installation and 
assembling, as well as special regimes for intra-Community acquisitions of new means of 
transport and products subject to excise duties, will not be discussed here, as they are not 
vital for this article. 
14  Article 402 RVD states that the transitional system will be replaced by defi nitive arrange-
ments based in principle on the taxation in the Member State of origin of the supply.
15  Council Directive 91/680/EEC of 16 December 1991 supplementing the common sys-
tem of value added tax and amending Directive 77/388/EEC with a view to the abolition of 
fi scal frontiers [1991] OJ L376/1.
16  Bojan ©kof, Davek na dodano vrednost po novem - kako poslovati na notranjem trgu - 101 
primer (DavËni inštitut, 2004) 15-16.
17  Terra and Kajus (n 11) 791.
18  Also called ‘postponed accounting’ or ‘deferred payment’. We will later see that this 
makes MTIC VAT frauds possible.
19  Intra-Community supplies of goods between two taxable persons with valid VAT identi-
fi cation numbers are taxed in the Member State where dispatch or transport of these goods 
ends (Article 40 RVD) or in the Member State which issued the VAT identifi cation number 
under which the person acquiring the goods made the acquisition (Article 41 RVD). Similar 
rules apply to (intra-Community) supply of services, including tradable services. According 
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and can at the same time deduct this amount (Article 168(c) RVD).20 So, 
no amount of VAT is actually paid into the budget of the destination coun-
try when the acquisition takes place. In principle, the destination country 
collects VAT when the next transaction is performed - when the acquirer 
supplies the acquired goods to a third person in the same country. 
2.2. MTIC and carousel VAT frauds explained and measures to 
prevent them
2.2.1. Missing trader and MTIC frauds
Generally speaking, a missing trader is a VAT taxable person that 
collects VAT on sales and then disappears, absconding with the VAT col-
lected.21 The EU defi nition is, in my opinion, narrower. Commission Regu-
lation (EC) 1925/2004 of 29 October 2004 laying down detailed rules for 
implementing certain provisions of Council Regulation (EC) 1798/2003 
concerning administrative cooperation in the fi eld of value-added tax 
[2004] OJ L331/13 defi nes in Article 2 (for the purposes of the regula-
tion) ‘missing trader’ as a trader registered as a taxable person for VAT 
purposes who, potentially with a fraudulent intent, acquires or purports 
to acquire goods or services without payment of VAT and supplies these 
goods or services with VAT but does not remit the VAT due to the appropri-
ate national authority. In comparison with the general meaning of missing 
trader, the EU defi nition clearly requires that the (factual or purported) 
acquisition of goods and services must be without the payment of VAT. The 
second part of the defi nition is similar - the trader goes missing without 
paying the collected VAT to the budget. Regardless of the defi nition, it is 
clear that to be considered a missing trader it is not necessary for the tax-
able person to be involved in intra-Community transactions. 
In the following examples22 we will show that it is far more lucra-
tive to be a missing trader in situations where goods and services are 
acquired without paying VAT. 
to a general rule, business-to-business supplies of services are taxed where the taxable per-
son to whom the services are provided has established his business (Article 44 RVD).
20  It must be noted that the acquirer can deduct the full amount only if he has the right to 
the full deduction. To put it simply, the acquirer can do so if the transactions he provides 
are not exempted from VAT. 
21  In Slovenia’s example, this usually means that the fi rm is transferred from real decision 
makers to indigent and uneducated individuals not residing in Slovenia but rather in the 
countries of ex-Yugoslavia, mostly Bosnia and Herzegovina and Serbia. Most of them have 
never been to Slovenia and do not plan to go there. These persons are formal directors and 
are owners of rather small amounts of money. The actual decision makers are Slovenian 
citizens who collect the illegal ‘profi ts’. 
22  The example is adapted from Leah Durner and Jon Sedon, ‘VAT Administration Issues 
and Enforcement’ (Views on VAT: An Article Series 2011) <http://www.kpmginstitutes.
com/taxwatch/insights/2011/pdf/vat-compilation.pdf> accessed 4 May 2012, 70-71.
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Suppose companies A, B and C are all VAT registered taxable per-
sons in Member State X that has a VAT rate of 20%. They all operate 
exclusively in Member State X. Suppose Company A sells goods to Com-
pany B for EUR 120 (EUR 100 net price and EUR 20 VAT). Company B 
resells these goods to Company C for EUR 144 (EUR 120 net price and 
EUR 24 VAT). Company B then disappears without fi ling its periodic VAT 
return and remitting EUR 24 VAT collected from Company C to the budg-
et of Member State X. Company B illegally ‘earns’ EUR 4 in VAT from the 
added value (EUR 24 not remitted minus EUR 20 paid to company A).23
Now, assume that Company A operates exclusively in Member State 
X while Companies B and C operate exclusively in Country Y which is 
not a Member State but has the same 20% VAT rate. Exports from Mem-
ber State X are zero-rated, but at the border to County Y, VAT is collected 
by customs from the importer (Company B), so the result stays as above. 
If Company B disappears without fi ling its periodic VAT return and re-
mitting the VAT collected from the sale of goods to Company C, it will il-
legally ‘earn’ EUR 4 (added value is EUR 20 plus 20% of this amount).24 
In intra-Community transactions, however, where Company A op-
erates exclusively in Member State X and Companies B and C operate 
exclusively in Member State Z (where the VAT rate is 20%), the missing 
trader gain can be greater. The fi scal frontiers between EU Member States 
are abolished and customs no longer allot VAT. Instead, VAT is self-ac-
counted by the acquiring business (Company B). Company A will issue an 
invoice without VAT (net invoice, stating that Company B has to pay EUR 
100). After the intra-Community acquisition, Company B sells the goods 
to Company C and collects EUR 144 (EUR 120 is the net price and EUR 24 
is VAT). Then it disappears without fi ling its periodic return25 in which it 
would have to self-declare the acquisition from Company A (EUR 20 VAT), 
the right to deduct this amount and the supply of goods to Company C 
(EUR 24 VAT). This means that Company B will illegally ‘earn’ EUR 24. 
The same amount is the revenue loss of Member State Z.
The last example above shows the MTIC modus operandi. 
23  It must be noted that the gain for the missing trader could be EUR 24 if the taxable per-
son (in his periodic VAT return) claims for an (actual or calculative) refund of the input VAT 
(EUR 20) that he paid to the supplier. This claim would be very bold, since the chances for 
the tax authorities to catch the missing trader would be greater. But it is still possible. 
24  Under the same criteria as in the previous footnote, the gain for the missing trader could 
also be EUR 24. 
25  Other options are (1) that periodic returns are fi led, but the mentioned transactions 
are not reported, or (2) that periodic returns are fi led and the mentioned transactions are 
reported but are not paid. Marjan MaËek, ‘Sistemske utaje davka na dodano vrednost in 
ugotovite davËne uprave RS’ (2010) 1 Pravosodni bilten 117, 123. 
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2.2.2. Carousel frauds
Carousel frauds are a more complex variation of MTIC frauds. A group 
of companies sell the same goods or services in a circle to achieve an ille-
gal ‘profi t’ by repeating the MTIC modus operandi over and over again. The 
main difference between MTIC and carousel frauds is therefore that goods 
or tradable services eventually make their way back to the original seller, 
completing the loop (thus the term ‘carousel’).26 One of the basic models 
is drawn below. Note that this is a simplifi ed model and that many varia-
tions are possible in practice. They include transactions between ten and 
more participants and several Member States, which makes detection and 
proving the connections very diffi cult, if not impossible.27 
Figure 1: A basic carousel fraud model28
26  Durner and Sedon (n 22) 71.
27  Stephen Smith, ‘VAT Fraud in the European Union’ (VAT: Current Issues of Interest - 
Workshop 2008) PE Report 400.993 11, 13. 
28  Adapted from European Union Committee (n 8) para 6. 

























Company A: Conduit Company 
 
1. Purchases goods: either from 
Company D (completing the carousel) 
or new goods with which to start the 
carousel. 
 
2. Supplies goods to Company B in 
another Member State. The supply is 
VAT zero-rated.  
Company C: “Buffer” Company 
 
1. Buys goods from Company B at 
VAT-inclusive price. 
 
2. Sells goods to Company D, charging 
VAT. Company C may be wholly 
unaware of the fraud. 
 
(There could be multiple buffer 
companies between Companies B and 
D, some or all of which may be 
honest.) 
Company B: The Missing Trader 
 
1. Purchases goods from Company A in Member 
State X. Pays no VAT on purchase, because intra-
Community supply by Company A is zero-rated. 
 
2. Charges and receives VAT on sale to Company 
C. 
 
3. Disappears without remitting the VAT to the 
revenue authorities. 
Company D: Broker 
 
1. Pays VAT on purchase from Company C. 
 
2. Supplies goods as an intra-Community 
transaction to Company A, and receives a refund 
of VAT from the revenue authority on supplied 
goods. 
 
3. In effect reclaims the VAT not paid by B, and 
crystallises the revenue authority’s loss. 
EUR 100 + EUR 0 VAT 
EUR 120 + EUR 24 VAT 
EUR 120 + EUR 24 VAT 
EUR 120 + EUR 0 VAT 
New goods join 
carousel. 
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For the sake of simplicity, let us assume that Member States X and 
Y have a 20% VAT rate. Company A from Member State X sold goods for 
EUR 100 to Company B located in Member State Y. Company A (missing 
trader company) performs an intra-Community supply which is zero-rat-
ed and therefore charges no VAT to Company B. Company B has to self-
account the VAT (EUR 20) on its next periodic return because it made 
an intra-Community acquisition (so-called reverse charge mechanism). 
Company B then sells goods to Company C (buffer company) in the same 
Member State for EUR 144 (EUR 120 net price and EUR 24 VAT). Compa-
ny B does not report the acquisition, does not deduct input VAT and also 
does not report the supply to Company C and therefore gains an illegal 
EUR 24 of VAT that should be paid into Member State Y’s budget. Com-
pany C then sells the goods to Company D for the same price. Since no 
value was added, the input and output tax are the same amount, and no 
additional VAT is remitted to Member State Y. Company D then performs 
an intra-Community supply to Company A in Member State X. This sup-
ply is zero-rated, but Company D collects input VAT from Member State 
Y that it paid when purchasing the goods from Company C (EUR 24). 
Company A can then start the carousel again using the same companies 
and Member States, or different ones.29 
It should be noted that the conduit company (Company A), the miss-
ing trader (Company B) and the broker (Company D) are the ones that 
planned the fraud.30 The main purpose of the Buffer Company is to con-
ceal the link between the missing trader (Company B) and the broker 
(Company D).31 Company C can participate in the fraud either knowingly 
or unknowingly. 
2.2.3. How to prevent MTIC and carousel VAT frauds
Theoretically, there are several ways to prevent or minimise MTIC 
and carousel VAT frauds. For the purposes of this article, we will divide 
measures into two groups: in the fi rst one there are those that do not 
29  In one of the widely reported carousel fraud cases, a 21-year-old fraudster appeared to 
be selling 10% of the world supply of a kind of computer chip. In fact, he had only a single 
box of chips going round and round in UK-Irish cross-border trade. Richard T Ainsworth, 
‘VAT Fraud and Technological Solutions’ (n 7) 204, 205.
30  These kinds of frauds are commonly performed by gangs involved in (more or less) organ-
ised crime. They can either be involved in just this sort of criminal activity alone, or MTIC 
and carousel frauds can form part of their activities, such as money-laundering and smug-
gling. European Union Committee (n 8) para 31. Similarly Konstantin Pashev, ‘Fighting VAT 
Fraud: The Bulgarian Experience’ (2006) Center for the Study of Democracy Working Paper 
0606/2 <http://eduart0.tripod.com/sitebuildercontent/sitebuilderfi les/vatfraudbulgaria_
21f.pdf> accessed 6 May 2012.
31  MaËek (n 23) 117, 122. 
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demand any changes of the current intra-Community VAT system and 
can therefore be implemented by each Member State individually; the 
second group consists of either implementing technological solutions (for 
example, Real Time VAT, the VAT Locator Number, Digital VAT)32 or abol-
ishing the zero-rating of intra-Community business-to-business trade.33 
We will deal only with the fi rst group here. 
The fi rst possibility is the least radical. It consists of improving: 
- the performance of tax inspections; 
- cooperation between tax authorities in different Member States; 
- imposing liability on persons participating in frauds and refusal 
of VAT deduction, etc.34
The goal here is to prevent MTIC and carousel frauds without chang-
ing the current taxation of intra-Community supplies (zero-rate, reverse 
charge, deferred payment). Organisational measures can be implement-
ed, such as establishing special departments that deal exclusively with 
detecting and investigating MTIC and carousel frauds, training of tax in-
spectors, etc. Other measures could include tighter checks on business-
es seeking to register for VAT (on-sight visits, review of concluded con-
tracts, examination of business plans, etc), ex offi cio withdrawal of VAT 
identifi cation numbers, slowing down payments of VAT refunds relative 
to the collection of the VAT due, requiring guarantees in dubious cases, 
the obligation for new VAT identifi ed taxable persons to fi le returns every 
month for a period of one year, regardless of their turnover, introducing 
reverse charges in risky sectors (construction, real estate supplies, waste 
supplies, etc) for supplies in a Member State,35 introducing transfer pric-
ing to determine taxable amounts in the case of transactions between 
closely connected (associated) taxable persons, the obligation for taxable 
persons that fi le their fi rst VAT return to enclose a list of received and is-
sued invoices, etc.36 Member States should more often use the possibility 
32  For a more detailed explanation, see Ainsworth, ‘VAT Fraud and Technological Solutions’ 
(n 7) 204, 210-23.
33  For more on alternatives to zero-rating in intra-Community trade, see Smith (n 25) 11, 
17-18 and European Union Committee (n 8) paras 53-76.
34  Improving misdemeanour and criminal proceedings could also be part of this category 
due to the special and general preventive function of misdemeanour and criminal law. But 
since we are focusing on mostly administrative measures in this article, these views will not 
be discussed here. 
35  The effect of introducing a reverse charge on certain products has had limited success, 
because the fraudsters can simply move to other goods. On the other hand, a universal 
reverse charge is not the answer, because VAT would become a single-stage retail tax and 
therefore more susceptible to revenue loss through unreported sales. 
36  Some of these measures were introduced by the Slovenian tax authority to prevent MTIC 
and carousel VAT frauds. MaËek (n 23) 124-30. 
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to exchange relevant data and use the VAT Information Exchange Sys-
tem (hereinafter VIES), operated by the European Commission.37 Since 
it is often impossible to claim stolen VAT from missing traders, tax au-
thorities can demand the same amount from other businesses that have 
collaborated in the frauds by refusing VAT deductions or by imposing 
their liability to pay for the missing amount of VAT. We will discuss these 
issues in the next section, where the ECJ case law is described. 
Finally, it must be noted that these measures only prevent MTIC and 
carousel frauds to some extent, but they cannot prevent them entirely. 
Furthermore, they also impose on-going costs on businesses. A perma-
nent solution would therefore be either to implement one of the techno-
logical solutions or to change the taxing of intra-Community business-
to-business trade. Due to a lack of political will in Member States, this is 
easier said than done. All Member States must unanimously agree with 
changes to the system. Basically, they all agree that the system must 
change, but cannot agree on how.
3. ECJ case law
Since Member States cannot unanimously agree on which techno-
logical solutions should be implemented or even on how intra-Commu-
nity supplies should be taxed in order to prevent MTIC and carousel 
frauds, it is up to each Member States to do its best to minimise the 
MTIC and carousel fraud VAT gap.38 
Since missing trader fi rms are missing, ‘stolen’ VAT cannot be ac-
cessed from them, so Member States try to retrieve at least some of these 
amounts from persons who were knowingly or unknowingly part of the 
MITC or carousel tax fraud chain. Conditions under which they can do 
this are best presented in the ECJ milestone judgments that deal with 
MTIC and carousel frauds. They basically deal with two issues: (1) to 
Smith (n 25) 11, 15-17 notes: ‘But it has to be noted that these measures may reduce the 
risk of VAT fraud, some of them may have less-desirable side-effects. More bureaucratic 
VAT registration procedures and slower payment of VAT refunds might harm legitimate 
business as well as discouraging fraud, and these effects may outweigh the enforcement 
gains. The authorities have a diffi cult balance to strike, between ensuring that VAT admin-
istration does not impose excessive burdens on business in general and ensuring that it is 
not unduly exposed to fraud. Some level of VAT evasion may well have to be tolerated in the 
wider business interest.’
37  According to the European Union Committee (n 8) para 34, in 2005 VIES was signifi -
cantly underused. Due to the lack of current data, we cannot say if this has statistically 
improved throughout the Community, but in our experiences representing clients in tax 
law cases Slovenian tax authorities are constantly monitoring the VIES system, searching 
for possible VAT frauds.
38  The VAT gap is the difference between net VAT liability and total VAT collections.
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refuse a VAT deduction for supplies made to a business by a missing 
trader, and (2) to hold a business jointly and severally liable for partici-
pating in an MTIC or carousel fraud.
3.1. Refusal of a VAT deduction
There are two milestone cases in which the ECJ developed its stand-
point on VAT deduction when a missing trader made a supply to a tax-
able person and made a deduction on the basis of a received invoice: joint 
cases Optigen Ltd, Fulcrum Electronics Ltd and Bond House Systems Ltd 
v Commissioners of Customs & Excise39 (hereinafter Optigen and others) 
and joined cases Axel Kittel v État belge and État belge v Recolta Recycling 
SPRL40 (hereinafter Kittel and Recolta).
3.1.1. Optigen and others 
Optigen, Fulcrum and Bond House essentially carried out the busi-
ness of buying central processing units (CPUs) from companies estab-
lished in the United Kingdom and selling them to purchasers established 
in another Member State. The transactions in question formed part of 
a carousel, but Optigen, Fulcrum and Bond House were not aware of 
this. The question that the ECJ had to answer was, fi rst, if transactions 
which are not themselves vitiated by VAT fraud, but which form part of a 
chain of supply in which another prior or subsequent transaction is viti-
ated by such fraud, without the trader engaged in the fi rst transactions 
knowing or having any means of knowing, constitute supplies of goods 
or services effected by a taxable person acting as such and an economic 
activity, and, second, whether, in such circumstances, the right of that 
trader to deduct input VAT may be limited.
In paragraphs 53 and 54, the ECJ repeated its view on the right to 
deduct. This right is an integral part of the VAT scheme and in principle 
may not be limited. It must be exercised immediately in respect of all the 
taxes charged on transactions relating to inputs. It is therefore irrelevant 
for the right to deduct input VAT whether the VAT on the earlier or later 
sale of the goods concerned to the end-user has or has not been paid to 
the public purse. 
In the ECJ’s view (paragraph 55), a taxable person cannot be denied 
the right to deduct input VAT only because he was, without knowing or 
having any means of knowing, participating in a carousel fraud. It is 
39  Joint cases C-354/03, C-355/03 and C-484/03 Optigen Ltd, Fulcrum Electronics Ltd 
and Bond House Systems Ltd v Commissioners of Customs & Excise [2006] ECR I-483.
40  Joint cases C-439/04 and C-440/04 Axel Kittel v État belge and État belge v Recolta 
Recycling SPRL [2006] ECR I-06161.
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clear that the ECJ has indicated, but not expressly stated, that a taxable 
person that was knowingly participating in carousel frauds would not 
have the right to deduct input VAT.41 
3.1.2. Kittel and Recolta
Ang Computime Belgium (‘Computime’) bought and resold computer 
components. The Belgium tax authorities decided that Computime had 
knowingly participated in a carousel fraud and that the supplies effected 
to Computime were fi ctitious. As a result, they refused to allow Compu-
time the right to deduct the VAT paid on those supplies (Mr Kittel was 
Computime’s receiver).
Recolta bought luxury vehicles. The relevant seller did not account 
for the VAT paid by Recolta, which resold the vehicles free of VAT (intra-
Community supply). An investigation showed that both parties selling 
to Recolta and purchasing from it had set up a carousel fraud, of which 
the transactions with Recolta formed part. Recolta was issued with a 
demand for payment.
The ECJ was asked two questions. To put it simply, the fi rst ques-
tion was whether the doctrine of Optigen and others is also valid in trans-
actions where the supplier commits a fraud in relation to the recipient - a 
taxable person - who did not know and could not have known anything 
about the fraud. The second question was whether a taxable person who 
is a recipient of the supply of goods who knew or should have known that 
he was participating in a transaction involving the fraudulent evasion of 
VAT loses his right to deduct input VAT connected with those transac-
tions. 
So the Kittel and Recolta case is actually an evolution of the case 
of Optigen and others. The ECJ states that the doctrine of Optigen and 
others is also applicable to fraudulent transactions where the recipient 
of the supplies knows nothing or could know nothing (paragraph 46). 
So, if a supplier is fraudulent, but the recipient knows nothing or could 
not know of his intention, the recipient’s right to deduct input VAT, con-
nected with that transaction, stays intact. For the right of the taxable 
person to deduct input VAT, it is also irrelevant if VAT was actually paid 
to the Treasury (paragraph 48). 
Taxable persons who take every precaution which could reasonably 
be required of them to ensure that their transactions are not connected 
with a fraud must be able to rely on the legality of those transactions 
41  The ECJ dealt with this question less than six months later in the Kittel and Recolta 
case. 
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without the risk of losing their right to deduct input VAT (paragraph 51). 
A taxable person who knew or should have known that through his pur-
chase he was taking part in transactions connected with the fraudulent 
evasion of VAT must be regarded as a participant in the fraud, irrespec-
tive of whether or not he profi ted through the resale of the goods. In such 
situations, the taxable person aids the perpetrators of the fraud and 
becomes their accomplice (paragraphs 56 and 57). 
The ECJ notes that such an interpretation of the VAT system makes 
it more diffi cult to carry out fraudulent transactions and is apt to prevent 
them.
3.2. Joint and several liability
The main case in which the ECJ dealt with joint and several liability 
is Case C-384/04 Commissioners of Customs & Excise, Attorney General 
v Federation of Technological Industries and Others [2006] ECR I-4191 
(hereinafter: FTI and others). 
The facts of the case were that a large group of companies was trad-
ing in mobile telephones and computer processing units. They were col-
laborating in MTIC and carousel frauds. According to the VAT Act valid 
in the United Kingdom, the tax commissioner decided that they were 
jointly and severally liable for unpaid VAT by missing traders. In the pro-
ceedings before the ECJ, they claimed that the provision of VAT Act, on 
the basis of which they were ordered to pay VAT, was contrary to Com-
munity law. 
The ECJ disagreed with their view, but defi ned a few limits. Mem-
ber States are allowed to enact legislation which provides that a taxable 
person, to whom a supply of goods or services has been made and who 
knew, or had reasonable grounds to suspect, that some or all of the 
value added tax payable in respect of that supply, or of any previous or 
subsequent supply, would go unpaid, may be made jointly and severally 
liable, with the person who is initially liable, for payment of that tax. But 
such legislation must comply with the general principles of law which 
form part of the Community legal order and which include, in particular, 
the principles of legal certainty and proportionality. In addition, Member 
States may enact measures which impose on the jointly and severally 
liable persons a requirement to provide security for the payment of that 
tax which is due.
So those traders who take every precaution which could reasonably 
be required of them to ensure that their transactions do not form part 
of a chain which includes a transaction vitiated by VAT fraud must be 
able to rely on the legality of those transactions without the risk of being 
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made jointly and severally liable to pay the VAT due from another tax-
able person. 
So Article 205 RVD allows Member States to pass a law according to 
which taxable persons who knew, or had reasonable grounds to suspect, 
that they are part of an MTIC or carousel fraud can be held liable to pay 
‘stolen’ VAT. 
4. ECtHR case law
The leading ECtHR case that deals with responsibility in VAT frauds 
is the Bulves AD case.42 Bulves AD, a Bulgarian joint-stock company, was 
a VAT taxable person that purchased goods from another taxable per-
son, paid the amount on the invoice and deducted the input VAT. Upon 
audit, the tax inspector decided that Bulves AD was not entitled to the 
credit, as the supplier had failed to record its supply of goods in its ac-
counting records for the month that the supply was made (August 2000), 
but did so in October 2000. 
The ECtHR decided that Bulgaria violated Article 1 of Protocol No 1 
to the ECHR that provides for the right to the peaceful enjoyment of one’s 
possessions,43 because VAT credit was disallowed. The reason for this 
decision was that Bulves AD had no knowledge of the potential fraud of 
the VAT system. Even more, the applicant had no means to obtain such 
knowledge. Therefore, Bulves AD should not suffer the full consequences 
of its supplier’s failure to duly report the supply. 
According to the ECtHR, Contracting States are allowed to curb 
fraudulent abuse of the VAT system of taxation. When Contracting States 
possess information of such abuse by a specifi c individual or entity, they 
may take appropriate measures to prevent, stop or punish it. However, 
it is considered that if national authorities, without any indication of di-
rect involvement by an individual or entity in fraudulent abuse of a VAT 
chain of supply,44 or knowledge thereof, nevertheless penalise the fully 
compliant recipient of a VAT-taxable supply for the actions or inactions 
of a supplier over which it has no control and in relation to which it has 
42  Bulves AD v Bulgaria App no 3991/03 (ECtHR, 22. January 2009). 
43  Article 1, Protocol No. 1 to the ECHR 
‘Every natural or legal person is entitled to the peaceful enjoyment of his possessions. No 
one shall be deprived of his possessions except in the public interest and subject to the 
conditions provided for by law and by the general principles of international law.
The preceding provisions shall not, however, in any way impair the right of a State to en-
force such laws as it deems necessary to control the use of property in accordance with the 
general interest or to secure the payment of taxes or other contributions or penalties.’
44  The ECtHR repeated its view in the case Intersplav v Ukraine App no 803/02 (ECtHR 25 
May 2007) para 38.
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no means of monitoring or securing compliance, they are going beyond 
what is reasonable, and upset the fair balance that must be maintained 
between the demands of the general interest of the community and the 
requirements of the protection of the right of property.
Interestingly, in the Bulves case, the ECtHR briefl y analysed the 
ECJ case law discussed above.45 But since Bulgaria had only entered the 
EU on 1 January 2007, Bulves AD could only seek protection before the 
ECtHR and not before the ECJ. 
The ECtHR repeated its views in yet another Bulgarian case, 
namely the Business Support Centre46 case. The facts of this case are 
basically the same as those in the Bulves case and will not be dis-
cussed here. Simply put, the Court decided that if there are no asser-
tions that there was fraud in relation to the VAT system of which a tax-
able person who deducts input VAT had any knowledge or the means 
to obtain such knowledge, that person cannot be denied VAT deduction 
(paragraph 24). The Court also added that when tax authorities dis-
cover that a supplier has failed to fully and timely discharge his VAT 
reporting and payments obligation, they must take the initiative to 
collect VAT from the supplier and not to deny the acquirer the right to 
deduct input VAT.
5. A short ECJ and ECtHR case law analysis
The ECJ’s view is based on the so-called knowledge test. A taxable 
person with factual or implied knowledge that he was participating in 
fraud is either not allowed to deduct input VAT or can be jointly and sev-
erally liable for the payment of the ‘stolen’ amount of VAT to the budget. 
Free from liability are those taxable persons who take every precaution 
which can reasonably be required of them to ensure that their transac-
tions do not form part of a chain of fraud.
The ECtHR is, in my opinion, basically saying the same but us-
ing a slightly different wording.47 A taxable person is allowed to deduct 
input VAT if he had no knowledge (factual knowledge) or had no means 
to obtain such knowledge by means of the ability to control the person 
45  FTI and others; and Kittel and Recolta (paras 29-32). 
46  Business Support Centre v Bulgaria App no 6689/03 (ECtHR 18 June 2010).
47  For a different opinion, see Vladimir Gritsenko, ‘A Taxing Question for Human Rights: 
The European Court of Human Rights, the Value Added Tax, and the Russian Federation’ 
(2011) SMC LTD, <http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1786993#captch
aSection> accessed 13 May 2012, 5. 
The author states that a Plenum of the High Arbitration Court of the Russian Federation in 
2006 issued guidelines that are consistent with ECtHR case law. 
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who evaded VAT, by means of the ability to monitor and secure his VAT 
compliance (implied knowledge). 
In short, taxable persons must be careful and prudent in their busi-
ness transactions in which VAT should paid. They must take every rea-
sonable precaution to avoid transactions involving VAT fraud, and if they 
act in such a way, they cannot be held liable for the payment of VAT or 
denied the right to deduct input VAT. The same rules apply in the EU and 
the ECHR Member States.
6. Conclusion
The main reason for MTIC and carousel frauds is the transitional 
VAT system for taxing intra-Community supplies with its zero-rating in 
the ‘exporting’ Member State. It is expected that Member States will not 
be able to agree on a different defi nitive system soon and this transition 
will last for several years. This means that the opportunity for MTIC and 
carousel frauds will not be eliminated. In the meantime, Member States 
will continue to minimise the tax gap arising from these systematic VAT 
frauds by imposing liability on other persons participating in the VAT 
frauds, either by not allowing them to deduct input VAT or by imposing 
their joint and several liability for the ‘missing’ VAT. Under the current 
ECJ and ECtHR case law, which is not likely to change, ‘stolen’ VAT can 
only be recovered from them if they knew or should have known that 
they are participating in VAT fraud. As long as these persons are careful 
enough to ensure that their transactions are not part of the fraud, no 
VAT will be imposed on them. 
This solution is not adequate to prevent MTIC and carousel frauds. I 
see it more as a limitation on tax inspectors, so that they are constrained 
to impose missing VAT on innocent taxable persons who are part of the 
chain transaction. Sooner or later, a more permanent solution will have 
to be enacted. The size of the MTIC and carousel frauds is just too big 
and Member States are losing too much. The fi nancial crisis has already 
lowered Member States income from VAT and this could be a good time 
to rethink the taxation of intra-Community supplies.
